That some reasonings are genuine, while others seem to be so but are not, is evident. This happens with arguments, as also elsewhere, through a certain likeness between the genuine and the sham. For physically some people are in a vigorous condition, while others merely seem to be so by blowing and rigging themselves out as the tribesmen do their victims for sacrifice; and some people are beautiful thanks to their beauty, while others seem to be so, by dint of embellishing themselves.

Book I chapter 12015-04-05
LET us now discuss sophistic refutations, i. e. what appear to be refutations but are really fallacies instead. We will begin in the natural order with the first. That some reasonings are genuine, while others seem to be so but are not, is evident. This happens with arguments, as also elsewhere, throu
Book I chapter 22015-04-05
Of arguments in dialogue form there are four classes:Didactic, Dialectical, Examination-arguments, and Contentious arguments. Didactic arguments are those that reason from the principles appropriate to each subject and not from the opinions held by the answerer (for the learner should take things on
Book I chapter 32015-04-04
First we must grasp the number of aims entertained by those who argue as competitors and rivals to the death. These are five in number, refutation, fallacy, paradox, solecism, and fifthly to reduce the opponent in the discussion to babbling-i. e. to constrain him to repeat himself a number of times:
Book I chapter 52015-04-04
There are two styles of refutation: for some depend on the language used, while some are independent of language. Those ways of producing the false appearance of an argument which depend on language are six in number: they are ambiguity, amphiboly, combination, division of words, accent, form of exp
Book I chapter 52015-04-03
Fallacies, then, that depend on Accident occur whenever any attribute is claimed to belong in like manner to a thing and to its accident. For since the same thing has many accidents there is no necessity that all the same attributes should belong to all of a things predicates and to their sub
Book I chapter 62015-04-03
The right way, then, is either to divide apparent proofs and refutations as above, or else to refer them all to ignorance of what refutation is, and make that our starting-point: for it is possible to analyse all the aforesaid modes of fallacy into breaches of the definition of a refut
Book I Chapter 72015-04-02
The deception comes about in the case of arguments that depend on ambiguity of words and of phrases because we are unable to divide the ambiguous term (for some terms it is not easy to divide, e. g. unity, being, and sameness), while in those that depend on c
Book I chapter 82015-04-02
Since we know on how many points apparent syllogisms depend, we know also on how many sophistical syllogisms and refutations may depend. By a sophistical refutation and syllogism I mean not only a syllogism or refutation which appears to be valid but is not, but also one which, though it is valid, o
Book I chapter 92015-04-01
The number of considerations on which depend the refutations of those who are refuted, we ought not to try to grasp without a knowledge of everything that is. This, however, is not the province of any special study: for possibly the sciences are infinite in number, so that obviously demonstrations m
Book I chapter 102015-04-01
It is no true distinction between arguments which some people draw when they say that some arguments are directed against the expression, and others against the thought expressed: for it is absurd to suppose that some arguments are directed against the expression and others against the thought, and
Book I chapter 112015-03-31
Moreover, to claim a Yes or No answer is the business not of a man who is showing something, but of one who is holding an examination. For the art of examining is a branch of dialectic and has in view not the man who has knowledge, but the ignorant pretender. He, then, is
Book I chapter 122015-03-31
So much, then, for apparent refutations. As for showing that the answerer is committing some fallacy, and drawing his argument into paradox-for this was the second item of the sophists programme-in the first place, then, this is best brought about by a certain manner of questioning and throug
Book I chapter 132015-03-30
Paradoxes, then, you should seek to elicit by means of these common-place rules. Now as for making any one babble, we have already said what we mean by to babble. This is the object in view in all arguments of the following kind: If it is all the same to state a term and to state its d
Book I chapter 142015-03-30
We have said before what kind of thing solecism is. It is possible both to commit it, and to seem to do so without doing so, and to do so without seeming to do so. Suppose, as Protagoras used to say that menis (wrath) and pelex (helmet) are masculine:
Book I chapter 152015-03-29
With a view then to refutation, one resource is length-for it is difficult to keep several things in view at once; and to secure length the elementary rules that have been stated before should be employed. One resource, on the other hand, is speed; for when people are left behind they look ah
Book I chapter 162015-03-29
We have now therefore dealt with the sources of questions, and the methods of questioning in contentious disputations: next we have to speak of answering, and of how solutions should be made, and of what requires them, and of what use is served by arguments of this kind. The use of them, then, is, fo
Book I chapter 172015-03-28
First then, just as we say that we ought sometimes to choose to prove something in the general estimation rather than in truth, so also we have sometimes to solve arguments rather in the general estimation than according to the truth. For it is a general rule in fighting contentious persons, to trea
Book I chapter 182015-03-28
Inasmuch as a proper solution is an exposure of false reasoning, showing on what kind of question the falsity depends, and whereas false reasoning has a double meaning-for it is used either if a false conclusion has been proved, or if there is only an apparent proof and no real one-the
Book I chapter 192015-03-27
Of the refutations, then, that depend upon ambiguity and amphiboly some contain some question with more than one meaning, while others contain a conclusion bearing a number of senses: e. g. In the proof that speaking of the silent is possible, the conclusion has a double meaning, while
Book I chapter 202015-03-27
It is evident also how one should solve those refutations that depend upon the division and combination of words: for if the expression means something different when divided and when combined, as soon as ones opponent draws his conclusion one should take the expression in the contrary way. A
Book I chapter 212015-03-26
Accentuation gives rise to no fallacious arguments, either as written or as spoken, except perhaps some few that might be made up; e. g. the following argument. Is ou katalueis a house? Yes. Is then ou katalueis the negation of katalueis? Yes.
Book I chapter 222015-03-26
It is clear also how one must meet those fallacies that depend on the identical expressions of things that are not identical, seeing that we are in possession of the kinds of predications. For the one man, say, has granted, when asked, that a term denoting a substance does not belong as an attribute
Book I chapter 232015-03-25
It is a general rule in dealing with arguments that depend on language that the solution always follows the opposite of the point on which the argument turns: e. g. If the argument depends upon combination, then the solution consists in division; if upon division, then in combination. Again, if it de
Book I chapter 242015-03-25
In dealing with arguments that depend on Accident, one and the same solution meets all cases. For since it is indeterminate when an attribute should be ascribed to a thing, in cases where it belongs to the accident of the thing, and since in some cases it is generally agreed and people admit that it
Book I chapter 252015-03-24
Those arguments which depend upon an expression that is valid of a particular thing, or in a particular respect, or place, or manner, or relation, and not valid absolutely, should be solved by considering the conclusion in relation to its contradictory, to see if any of these things can possibly hav
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